



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

## THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RECIPROCITY.

RECENT investigation has disclosed the fact that our reciprocity legislation in the past has not been the result of any systematic commercial policy. On the contrary, reciprocity has been clearly shown to have been the outgrowth of political expediency. Its origin has been traced in most cases to the exigencies of party politics. It has been pointed out, for example, that the reciprocity legislation of the McKinley and Dingley laws was not adopted for the purpose of inaugurating a régime of less restricted trade relations in which the tariff burdens of the consumer would be lightened, but that the provisions for reciprocal trade in both instances were clever political expedients devised to placate those interests which were clamoring for tariff revision and the expansion of American trade. The irresistible conclusion is, in short, that reciprocity has suffered in the past as a political makeshift in the hands of our politicians and statesmen, who, from an economic standpoint, have used it with a fine disregard of what the name is generally supposed to imply.<sup>1</sup>

It may be added further that our reciprocity experience has had a broader political significance. It has been concerned with external as well as internal politics. Detailed investigation reveals important tendencies and results in the field of world-politics. From the point of view of international relations the developments that have grown out of our reciprocity history have been even more significant than the economic considerations or the questions of domestic politics involved. Some of our treaties, such as the convention with Hawaii, have led to controversies with foreign governments regarding the most-favored-nation clause of existing treaties, and have given rise to an interpretation by our State Department of the favored-nation clause, entirely distinct from the European idea, in which it is held that reciprocity agreements are special arrangements to secure the advantages of which another government must make grants similar to those conceded by the country with which the reciprocity treaty is made.<sup>2</sup>

The principal factor of international import, however, to be

<sup>1</sup> LAUGHLIN AND WILLIS, *Reciprocity*.

<sup>2</sup> WHARTON, *International Law Digest*, 2d ed., Vol. II., p. 39.

reckoned with in our reciprocity history, has appeared in the influence exerted by reciprocal trade upon movements for the extension of the national domain. A reciprocity policy has oftentimes been proposed for the purpose of preventing the acquisition of new territory. On the other hand, it has also been put forward under the conviction that it would secure a foothold in foreign countries and prepare the way for ultimate territorial or political expansion. Moreover, the constant result of the operation of reciprocal trade has been an inclination toward the annexation of the countries with which treaties have been consummated. In almost every instance the presence of these tendencies is apparent in the causes leading to the negotiation or abrogation of reciprocal trade conventions, in the legislation bearing on the matter, or in the results arising from the actual operation of the reciprocity agreements. The fact and significance of their existence may be substantiated by a somewhat detailed examination of our reciprocity history.

#### THE CANADIAN TREATY.

The first actual experience of the United States in the matter of reciprocal trade came through the operation of the Canadian treaty which covered the period 1854-66. The negotiations for reciprocity were inaugurated by Great Britain in response to a movement which had its origin in Canada almost a decade before the consummation of the treaty with the United States. At that time a general feeling of unrest prevailed throughout British North America. Resentment and dissatisfaction with the economic policy of the mother-country were beginning to make themselves strongly felt among the business and industrial classes. By the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 and the inauguration of a free-trade policy, Great Britain increased the existing discontent by abrogating the only part of her commercial system favorable to Canada. At the same time, the unpopular navigation laws still remained in force.

The people of Canada believed that with favorable commercial regulations they could develop the resources of their country and make it one of the most prosperous nations in the world. On the other hand, they considered the adoption of free trade by England a great calamity. Knowing that they could not regain the exclusive privileges which they had enjoyed in the British markets, the Canadian business and industrial classes soon perceived that they were in a worse position than the people of the United States, for the

reason that the markets of the latter country, in which their products could be most advantageously disposed of, were closed against them, and the American ports which offered the best outlets from upper Canada to the sea were inaccessible. Out of these conditions naturally came the belief that the inequalities of Canada's commercial condition could be remedied only by political union with this country. Unlike the Americans who rebelled because they were taxed without representation, the Canadians threatened to revolt unless the British people were taxed for the benefit of the colony. The agitation for alienation, thus begun, rapidly developed, and the demand for annexation to the United States soon became forcible and widespread.

But the movement in England which, at the same time, was making for less restricted commercial intercourse helped to create a public feeling responsive to the claims of the colonists. Commercial autonomy was granted to Canada, and this concession, together with the greater freedom of trade with the United States under the tariff law of 1846, for a time partially checked Canadian discontent.

The proposed remedy, however, did not fully meet existing needs. Dissatisfaction with trade conditions continued, and annexation was soon urged with renewed vigor. The Canadian businessman recognized the advantages enjoyed by his competitor across the border, and contended that the inequalities of his position could be remedied only in one of three ways: (1) by a tax upon American products imported into England; (2) by reciprocal trade relations with the United States; (3) by annexation to the latter country. The agitation and unrest under these circumstances became extensive and violent in nature, threatening to break forth into revolution or open rebellion. A credible correspondent of the *New York Commercial*, traveling in Canada in the autumn of 1848, wrote from Toronto concerning the state of the public mind as follows:

In passing through the country I find a growing disposition to speak more favorably of the institutions of the United States than I ever knew before; and this too in a quarter where I little expected to observe it. Indeed, the subject of annexation to the United States is quite the order of the day.<sup>3</sup>

Another trustworthy source of contemporary information made the following comment:

Separation from England and annexation to the United States, by which

<sup>3</sup> *Niles Register*, Vol. LXXIV (1848), p. 223.

measures alone the Canadians can now see any chance of securing that commercial and general prosperity they aim at, are now openly talked of; not in the spirit of ranting patriotism, but of calm, resolute determination, as the only remedy for the evils which they have to complain of. This sort of talk is not confined to the radical and reckless portion of the population, those who are fanatics in politics or have nothing at stake, and would hope to profit by a state of revolutionary anarchy, but by those high in office, the intelligent and cultivated, the businessmen; in short, those who exercise a controlling influence in the affairs of the country. . . . The influence of the impending crisis is felt and acknowledged by all. Even the governor-general, in a dispatch to the home government remarkable for its directness and earnestness, urges prompt and speedy action.<sup>4</sup>

Lord Elgin, the governor-general thus referred to, in his private as well as his public correspondence, showed a full appreciation of the difficulties of the situation and their probable result. In March, 1849, he wrote to Lord Grey:

There has been a vast deal of talk about annexation, as is unfortunately always the case here when there is anything to agitate the public mind. . . . Undoubtedly it is in some quarters the utterance of very serious conviction; and if England will not make the sacrifices which are absolutely necessary to put the colonists in as good a position here commercially as the citizens of the States—in order to which free navigation and reciprocal trade with the States are necessary—the end may be nearer than we wot of.<sup>5</sup>

In another communication of November, 1849, Lord Elgin said:

But if things remain on their present footing in this respect, there is nothing before us but violent agitation ending in convulsion or annexation. . . . And I much fear that no means but the establishment of reciprocal trade between Canada and the States, or the imposition of a duty on the produce of the States when imported into England, will remove it.<sup>6</sup>

For England to impose discriminating duties upon American products was obviously impossible. She had already entered upon a free-trade policy, and a step backward in the direction of more restricted commercial relations would not have been countenanced. The repeal of the oppressive Navigation Laws in 1850 was received with great satisfaction in Canada, but it did not perceptibly alter the situation. It soon became evident that the only means of allaying Canadian discontent was the establishment of reciprocal trade relations with the United States.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 228.

<sup>5</sup> *Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin*, edited by T. WALROUD, pp. 100, 102, 104.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

These views, then so prevalent in Canada, met with favor on the other side of the border. The Mexican war and the attendant acquisition of territory had left a strong imperialistic feeling in the country, and a considerable class of American citizens desired the further extension of the national domain. This feeling grew with the belief that Great Britain had designs upon Cuba, and that other European powers were desirous of obtaining a foothold upon the American continent. Many filibustering expeditions were dispatched from the United States to Cuba during the period 1848-50, and there was open agitation for the purchase of the island both in Congress and in the country at large.

In this general desire for territorial expansion, although public attention was mainly focused upon the Latin-American countries, the British northern colonies were not forgotten. In the course of a debate in Congress in 1853, the claim of the English colonies to a place in the Union were strongly set forth by Representative Hill, of Ohio:

There is a country, and there is a people competent for self-government, that are prepared to take upon themselves the responsibilities of freedom, and which we may find for our interest to receive among us . . . and allow them to become part and parcel of this country. I refer to the whole British possessions upon the north. . . . Great Britain can have no object in holding the rule over these northern colonies, except national pride. The annexation of that territory to this union (to use terms of gentlemen) Destiny has ordained, and it will ere long take place.<sup>7</sup>

These utterances expressed the opinions of a considerable number of Congressmen and of a large section of the country. The existing state of the public mind was thus presented by a contemporary writer:

That those colonies are not members of our confederation seems a mere accident of political history. . . . The community of interests and pursuits between our northern states and the provinces is so entire as to scarcely admit of a line of demarkation. . . . There are also strong bonds of political sympathy between the colonists and ourselves — stronger, in fact, than unite them with the mother-country. . . . The circumstances create a strong fellow-feeling. . . . And it is this fellow-feeling that renders commercial restrictions not only oppressive and vexatious, but easy of evasion, and inoperative in proportion to their rigidity and minuteness.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> *Congressional Globe*, Fifty-second Congress, Second Session, 1853, Appendix, pp. 59, 60.

<sup>8</sup> *North American Review*, Vol. LXXIV (1852), pp. 174, 175.

But annexation was not without strong opposition in the United States. The protectionist looked upon it with disfavor. It meant a loss of the advantages which the protected interests had over their Canadian competitors. Reciprocity was unpalatable, but it was more to be desired. A reciprocity convention, although tending more toward the contemporary movement for tariff reform, would not destroy the protective principle and would be consistent with the old protectionist theory that the assistance sought from the government was not designed to be permanent. At the same time, among many advocates of free trade, annexation was viewed unfavorably, but reciprocal trade was welcomed as a method of bringing about a less restricted commercial policy.

The slavery question also had an influence upon the question. The South for many years had advocated the annexation of Cuba, Texas, and adjacent territory, but the movement for the incorporation of Canada into the American republic was regarded with suspicion. It was thought that the increased representation in Congress resulting from the annexation of the British provinces would place the South at the mercy of those persons who were not favorably inclined toward her cherished institution. As a natural consequence, southern statesmen were anxious to adopt any plan which would avert this danger.<sup>9</sup>

The project of reciprocal trade was thus conceived as a measure of political expediency. Lord Elgin, as has been indicated, fully realized the trend of Canadian feeling, and recognized the fact that decisive steps should be taken to quiet the discontent of the colonies. To accomplish this object, he was also fully aware that it was necessary to secure for Canada freer access to the markets of the United States. On the other side of the border a large number of people would have welcomed the annexation of Canada. At the same time, the advocates of a protective tariff preferred reciprocal trade to political union, and many tariff reformers were favorable to reciprocity because of their opinion that it would avert annexation. The people of the South also opposed the incorporation of Canada into the Union, and for this reason advocated the adoption of reciprocal trade. Moreover, many of the strongest adherents of an annexation policy believed that an era of reciprocity by bringing the two countries into more intimate and cordial relations, would irresistibly lead

<sup>9</sup> *Congressional Globe*, Thirty-eighth Congress, Second Session, p. 210.

to their political union.<sup>10</sup> In general terms, one form of opinion in the United States, although desiring the immediate annexation of Canada, was willing to accept reciprocity as a means of securing annexation in the future; the other eagerly adopted the reciprocity idea as an expedient for postponing indefinitely the political incorporation of Canada. Both of these points of view were in close keeping with Lord Elgin's cherished plan for thwarting the Canadian annexationists. The project of a reciprocity agreement was, therefore, favorably received on all sides. After several fruitless attempts at concurrent legislation, reciprocal trade relations were finally established by treaty negotiations.

As a political expedient the treaty was eminently successful. Canadian resentment against the home government gradually passed away, and the advantages of annexation to the United States were lost sight of in the general prosperity of the province. From an economic point of view also the convention was well drawn, and, with a few exceptions, popular, and the subsequent action of the United States government in terminating the treaty did not arise from any strong feeling of hostility toward reciprocity as a commercial policy.<sup>11</sup> The abrogation of the reciprocity convention by Congress in 1865 was really due to political causes, and was brought about by the anger and resentment of the northern states as a retaliatory measure against Great Britain and Canada for their friendly attitude toward the South during the Civil War.<sup>12</sup>

But the movement for annexation still had a large following, and the old question of political union was again brought to the front in the discussion over the repeal of reciprocity. The existing feeling of hostility against Canada and Great Britain was utilized as a basis for agitating the annexation of the British provinces. A considerable class of American citizens had foolishly brought themselves to believe that the repeal of the reciprocity treaty would have such disastrous results on Canadian industry and commerce that the colony would be forced to seek political union with the United States. The abrogation of reciprocal trade was, therefore, urged as a preliminary step which would finally lead to the acquisition of the

<sup>10</sup> *North American Review*, Vol. LXXIX (1854), p. 483.

<sup>11</sup> SIR E. W. WATKINS, *Canada and the States*, p. 400; *Congressional Globe*, Thirty-eighth Congress, Second Session, pp. 232, 233; *ibid.* 1865-66, Part II, p. 1210; *ibid.* (1864-65), pp. 210, 230.

<sup>12</sup> LAUGHLIN AND WILLIS, *Reciprocity*, pp. 58, 59.



province. Mr. Potter, the American consul at Montreal, in a speech before the Detroit convention of 1865 described in unequivocal terms the position of those persons who expected annexation to follow the abrogation of reciprocity :

We are ready to give you in Canada the most perfect reciprocity. We will give you complete free trade, but we ask you to come and share with us the responsibilities of our government. . . . I believe I express the general feeling of those who are the most friendly to the United States in Canada when I say it is not the policy of our government, or our policy, to continue this treaty, and I believe that in two years from the abrogation of the reciprocity treaty the people of Canada themselves will apply for admission to the United States.<sup>13</sup>

The danger of a renewal of reciprocity for the purpose of averting annexation was also recognized, and a warning issued to the annexationists to oppose this expedient. Mr. O. S. Wood, manager of the Montreal Telegraph Company, in a letter of July 10, 1865, to Consul Potter, said that "a renewal of the treaty would be the only effectual check on the annexation movement. I believe that the renewal of it would be one of the greatest political blunders on the part of the United States."<sup>14</sup>

Additional support was given to the movement for forcing Canada into the American republic through the repeal of reciprocity by a large class of citizens who claimed that the Canadian producer, if he was to receive the benefit of the American markets, should become a member of the Union and bear his share of the burdens and responsibilities of the government. It was justly urged that Canadian interests, owing to their freedom from our system of internal taxation growing out of the Civil War, received an unfair advantage over the home producer in the American market, and that the two countries could be put upon an equal basis only by political union or the negotiation of a more equitable treaty.

The adherents of these various forms of opinion, therefore, looked upon the abrogation of reciprocal trade relations with great satisfaction. The ridiculous belief was prevalent that Congress had at last opened the way for the entrance of the British provinces into the American republic. A short time before the expiration of the reciprocity treaty, a prominent Chicago newspaper asserted through its editorial columns that all the signs were then propitious for the fulfilment of Consul Potter's prediction :

<sup>13</sup> *Canada and the States*, p. 420.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 422.

The Canadians will soon discover that free trade and smuggling will not compensate them for the loss of the reciprocity treaty. They will stay out in the cold for a few years, and try all sorts of expedients, but in the end will be constrained to knock for admission into the Great Republic. Potter was right when he predicted that abrogation of the treaty would cause annexation.

But the expectations of the annexationists were never realized. The British possessions in North America were awakening to a consciousness of common interests, the idea of federation was being agitated, and in 1867 was fulfilled. Out of this action came a realization of nationality and a feeling of common ends to be attained which put an effectual check upon any further annexation tendencies. But even had the movement for the confederation of the British colonies not been in progress, there is small ground for believing that political union with the United States would have followed the repeal of the reciprocity treaty. It is a matter of record, however, that many persons anticipated such a result, and consequently gave their support to the abrogation of the arrangement.

#### THE UNRATIFIED TREATY WITH MEXICO.

After the Canadian treaty had been in operation for several years, an attempt was made to extend the reciprocity policy southward. On September 14, 1859, a reciprocal trade agreement with the government of Mexico was negotiated by Mr. McLane, the American minister to that country. The arrangement was designed to place the trade of the two nations upon a basis of "perfect reciprocity," but on May 31, 1860, the treaty was rejected by the Senate, the vote standing 27 to 18. Several subsequent attempts to secure favorable action met with failure.<sup>15</sup>

At the time of the negotiation of the Mexican treaty a revolution was in progress in Mexico. President Juarez and his forces were besieged in the city of Vera Cruz. On account of this precarious situation of the Mexican government, it was thought that by holding out to President Juarez an indefinite promise of assistance, he could be induced to sell or transfer to the United States certain Mexican provinces. Consequently, President Buchanan in his instructions to Minister McLane insisted that a cession of territory to the United States be included in the treaty. The Mexican government, however, refused to open negotiations on this basis. After several

<sup>15</sup> *Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate*, Vol. VIII (1858-61), pp. 192, 199.

months of fruitless effort, President Buchanan was forced to abandon the idea and notified Minister McLane to relinquish all demands for the acquisition of new territory. This was done, and a strictly commercial treaty of reciprocity was negotiated.<sup>16</sup>

As a natural consequence of his position on the slavery question, the action of President Buchanan was looked upon in the North with suspicion. The charge was made that the treaty was negotiated with a view to the ultimate annexation of Mexico, and with the purpose of introducing slavery. The Republican press, which most bitterly denounced the agreement, declared that by this means President Buchanan wished to increase the strength of the slave-holding states in Congress.<sup>17</sup> Hence when the treaty came up for discussion in the Senate, the political significance of the convention overshadowed any commercial considerations, and the Republicans united with the Disunion party to defeat it.

The original impulse, therefore, behind this movement for reciprocity with Mexico was the desire for more territory. When this failed, the advocates of territorial expansion seemed to consider that a strictly commercial reciprocity agreement would tend gradually to colonize Mexico with Americans, and to bring the two countries into closer relations and to a better understanding, as had formerly happened in the case of Texas. In this way the tendency toward a political union with Canada would be balanced by making possible the annexation of Mexico. While the evidence to uphold this latter view is not conclusive, the fact remains that the anti-slavery men thought the treaty dangerous and joined forces to prevent its ratification. The inference, therefore, is by no means an extravagant one.

#### THE HAWAIIAN EPISODE.

Our second actual experience with reciprocity was by the treaty of 1876 with Hawaii. This arrangement, both in its inception and termination, was fraught with much greater political significance than our former convention with Canada.

During the early part of the past century missionaries had gone to Hawaii in considerable numbers. The natives received them into their confidence, and lands were ceded and sold to them and to their children. The attitude of the Hawaiian government was also marked

<sup>16</sup> For a full contemporary account of the situation see EDWARD E. DUNBAR, *The Mexican Papers*, First Series, No. 3 (September 15, 1860).

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 96, 103.

by extreme generosity. Missionaries were recognized as public benefactors, exempted from taxation, and allowed to purchase real estate at a price 50 cents per acre less than it could be obtained by lay purchasers.<sup>18</sup> Large and valuable estates were thus secured by the clergy. In numerous cases by intermarriage with natives the descendants of missionaries came into possession of large plantations and fortunes. The majority of these did not follow the vocation of their fathers, but engaged in agriculture or some other lucrative business.

In the footsteps of the missionaries came a number of foreigners — chiefly Americans — who colonized the islands and sought to exploit the resources of the country for their own profit. Some engaged in business. Others acquired land from the natives for raising sugar and rice. Sugar-growing soon became the leading industry of the islands. The methods of culture, however, were crude. The natives were incompetent managers. They usually borrowed money in advance on their crops, made their sales through foreign agents, and were constantly in debt. Their fiscal agents in many instances foreclosed. By this method by purchase, inheritance, or intermarriage the sugar plantations of the islands fell into the possessions or under the control of foreigners, the majority of whom were Americans. Statistics were exhibited in the House of Representatives in 1876 showing that American control had been extended until twenty-five out of the thirty-two sugar plantations on the islands were owned by American citizens.<sup>19</sup>

Coincident with the passing of the resources of the islands into the hands of foreigners there arose an agitation for assistance from the United States government in developing the agricultural industries of the islands. The unprofitableness of sugar culture gave the main impetus to the movement. Every influence was exerted by the foreign residents to secure the free entrance of the sugar crop into the ports of the United States. It was obvious to the sugar planters that the simplest and most direct method of securing the pecuniary assistance they desired was the annexation of the islands. Political union with the United States was, therefore, agitated from time to time, but without success, and continued failure finally led to a movement for reciprocal trade as the next best solution of the problem.<sup>20</sup> A reciprocity treaty was negotiated in 1855, but was

<sup>18</sup> A HÅOLE, *Sandwich Islands*, 1854, p. 474.

<sup>19</sup> *Congressional Record*, Forty-fourth Congress, First Session, p. 5565.

<sup>20</sup> CHARLES NORDHOFF, *Northern California, Oregon, and the Sandwich Islands*, pp. 59-61.

rejected by the Senate. Another convention drawn up in 1867 met the same fate.<sup>21</sup> Not until 1875 were the advocates of reciprocity able to secure a favorable hearing. About this time the English and French residents were energetically attempting to secure the goodwill of the Hawaiian government, and the citizens of the United States at Honolulu urged prompt action by Congress for the purpose of maintaining American prestige.

In the autumn of 1874 David Kalakaua, king of the Sandwich Islands, visited the United States at the instigation of the sugar interests, and was shown many friendly attentions by this government. The primary object of his visit was to promote negotiations for reciprocity, and Minister Pierce, as well as the sugar planters, not only had full cognizance of this, but were so entirely in accord with it that, strengthened by their recommendations, his mission was successful.<sup>22</sup> Before leaving home he had appointed commissioners to negotiate a reciprocity agreement. They were met by representatives of the United States government, and a convention was drawn up and signed at Washington, on January 30, 1875.

When the treaty came before Congress, no positive commercial argument was put forward in its favor, and any pretense to commercial advantages was effectually refuted.<sup>23</sup> At the same time, the real influences which were behind the movement for reciprocal trade were clearly seen, and it was pointed out in detail that the Hawaiian sugar planters and the American interests in the islands, because of their failure to secure annexation to the United States, were seeking a reciprocity agreement as the next best scheme for making their holdings in the Sandwich Islands more profitable.<sup>24</sup> But these private investors or speculators were supported by a class of persons in this country who urged the adoption of reciprocal trade relations as a means of extending American political control over the Hawaiian archipelago. The majority of the Ways and Means Committee in their report to the House were of the opinion that the danger of British acquisition of Hawaii, or of the trade of the islands, afforded sufficient reason for the adoption of reciprocity. They advanced the

<sup>21</sup> A detailed account of this movement is to be had in *Senate Executive Document No. 77*, Fifty-second Congress, Second Session.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p., 149.

<sup>23</sup> *Report of Committees*, No. 116, Forty-fourth Congress, First Session (1875-76), p. 11.

<sup>24</sup> *Congressional Record*, Forty-fourth Congress, First Session, pp. 1495-97.

claim that in the absence of closer relations with this country Great Britain and Australia would monopolize the business of Hawaii, and the ties thus generated by intimate trade relations would be constantly strengthened until the islands finally became a part of the British Empire. On the other hand, it was argued that the establishment of reciprocal trade with this country would induce American citizens to go to the country and exploit its resources, capital from the United States would flow into the islands, closer trade relations would result, and the way would be gradually paved for the final control or acquisition of Hawaii, which was considered a matter of vital importance on account of the advantageous geographical position of the islands as a naval base in determining the future political and commercial status of the Pacific. The conclusion was thus reached that the commercial questions involved were subsidiary to the political advantages covered by the treaty.<sup>25</sup>

The same arguments were adopted and reiterated by members of Congress in discussing the treaty. They contended that grave political considerations demanded its ratification. Favorable opinions from the military branches of the government were even presented to lend additional weight to this position,<sup>26</sup> and the argument that the Sandwich Islands were valuable as a strategic base for future operations in the Pacific was backed up by the claim that the treaty of reciprocity in its practical workings would lead to the extension of American influence and ultimately to annexation. Reciprocity, in short, was to be used only as a means for the accomplishment of a final end—the incorporation of Hawaii into the American republic.

Said Senator Sargent:

My idea is that our influence will be strengthened there, that we never shall have to pay one dollar, but they [the Hawaiian Islands] will fall naturally to us. . . . The effect of the treaty is to encourage Americans to go there to make it an American colony, and, therefore, it will cost us nothing to buy it by and by, because it will be in our possession as Texas was in our possession by the American population supplanting in influence and numbers the Mexicans and Spaniards.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>25</sup> *Reports of Committees*, No. 116, Forty-fourth Congress, First Session (1875-76), pp. 7-11.

<sup>26</sup> *Congressional Record*, Forty-fourth Congress, First Session, pp. 1489-90.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5486. Other members of Congress were not so imperialistic in their leanings. It is worthy of careful notice, however, that they freely acknowledged that the operation of the treaty would lead toward annexation, and for

The expediency of substituting reciprocity for annexation, which was so prominent a factor in securing the passage of the Canadian treaty, was brought forward by those persons who opposed the immediate or ultimate acquisition of Hawaii. They contended that the ascendancy of American interests should be maintained at all hazards, and pointed out that a reciprocity agreement was the simplest way to control Hawaiian affairs; but if this method of procedure were not followed, and the reciprocity treaty failed of ratification, the only recourse remaining would be to annex the islands to this country. Hence reciprocal trade was strongly urged as a means of averting annexation.

These and similar arguments put forward by the annexationists and sugar interests proved effective. The treaty was ratified by Congress and became law on September 9, 1876.

The first effects of the operation of the reciprocity agreement more than realized the expectations of its imperialistic advocates. Prior to 1876 there had been no conscious flow of American capital to the islands, but after the adoption of reciprocal trade immense sums were invested. Plantations were obtained through lease or purchase, corporations organized, improved machinery imported, and sugar-production on a large scale begun.<sup>28</sup> Within one year after the adoption of the treaty thirteen new plantations were laid out, and, during 1878 fifteen more were prepared for cultivation. The extent to which American capitalists became interested in the sugar industry was shown by the visit to the islands, in 1879, of Mr. Claus Spreckels, the American sugar-refiner, who, together with some business associates, leased and purchased large tracts of land.<sup>29</sup> Before seven years had passed, two-thirds of the sugar plantations upon the islands were owned by citizens of the United States.<sup>30</sup> In 1889 the amount of capital invested in sugar plantations was equal in round numbers to \$30,000,000, and of this sum that very reason they opposed it. Mr. Garfield, who was then in the House, expressed his disapproval in no uncertain terms: "I do not approve of the Hawaiian treaty," he declared, "because it looks in the direction of securing possession of those islands. Hence I disclaim any purpose or suggestion of annexation of these islands as any part of my reason for supporting the treaty."

<sup>28</sup> H. P. BALDWIN, "The Sugar Industry in Hawaii," *Overland Monthly*, Vol. XXV (1895), p. 665.

<sup>29</sup> *Hawaiian Almanac* (Honolulu, 1879), p. 28; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1894, Appendix II, p. 667.

<sup>30</sup> LAUGHLIN AND WILLIS, *Reciprocity*, p. 74.

\$22,537,210 belonged to Americans.<sup>31</sup> Industries allied to sugar-production were soon started; banks were organized; and business houses were established. Colonists from the United States soon outnumbered those of other countries,<sup>32</sup> and American influence rapidly became predominant in every branch of business and in every department of the government, and within a decade after the passage of the treaty the islands had practically become an American colony.<sup>33</sup>

The effect of this influx of wealth and population into the islands soon became apparent.<sup>34</sup> It led to a radical change in the conduct of the missionary descendants and foreign residents toward the natives. The early planters had employed the native Hawaiians as laborers, and had lived with them upon their estates. With the adoption of reciprocity, however, and the passing of all the lands suitable for sugar-cultivation into the hands of foreigners, and the conversion of the plantations into joint-stock companies or syndicates, the contract-labor system was adopted by the new owners. Between 1876 and 1887 over 35,000 laborers from Japan, China, and the Portuguese possessions were brought into the islands to supplement or displace the Hawaiian labor supply. Moreover, commercial statesmen, chiefly the children of missionaries, who were receiving rich benefits from the prosperity of the country, had succeeded the sagacious and unselfish clerical statesmen who had tried to civilize the natives. Race-hatred arose. The new leaders were distrusted by the Hawaiians, who saw themselves destitute at the time of the country's greatest prosperity. Even the immigrants from China and Japan shared in the increased wealth of the country. The native Hawaiian was alone excluded.

The outcome was a constant friction between the natives and the foreigners, the object of each being to secure control of the government. The American residents were influenced by the desire to obtain closer and more stable commercial relations with the United States. The reciprocity treaty was to run for a period of

<sup>31</sup> CLAUS SPRECKELS, "The Future of the Sandwich Islands," *North American Review*, CLII (1891), p. 152.

<sup>32</sup> *Monthly Summary of Commerce and Finance*, July, 1901, Treasury Department, Bureau of Statistics, p. 83.

<sup>33</sup> EUGENE SCHUYLER, *American Diplomacy*, p. 444.

<sup>34</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1894, p. 916; statement of the Hawaiian Patriotic League.



seven years only. At any time thereafter it might be abrogated by a change of party administration in this country. Consequently reciprocal trade was considered by the Americans as a precarious basis for their business interests. They desired something more enduring—a basis of union that could not be destroyed by a change of commercial policy. They constantly had in mind the annexation of the islands to the United States, and aimed to secure the preponderating influence in the government in order to bring about political union when a favorable occasion should arise.

This motive was responsible for the direction of subsequent political events in the islands. The fears of the sugar-planters with regard to the permanency of their concessions were soon aroused by the hostile state of public opinion in the United States when the reciprocity treaty was about to expire by limitation.<sup>35</sup> At that time also the native Hawaiian party had secured a majority in the legislature, and an anti-missionary or foreign administration had been inaugurated.<sup>36</sup> Realizing that their interests were imperiled by the threatened repeal of reciprocity by the United States, and also by the political situation in the islands, the sugar interests at once set on foot a revolution to regain control of the government, and to treat for annexation to the United States. At this juncture, however, when the sugar oligarchy was once more securing political supremacy, their apprehensions of a change in the existing economic conditions were for the time quieted by the action of the American government in renewing the treaty for another period of seven years.<sup>37</sup> They dropped their annexation schemes, and merely sought the support of the United States to keep them in control of the government.<sup>38</sup>

But the dominant white class did not remain long undisturbed. Subsequent political events soon constrained them to take up again their schemes for annexation. Numerous intrigues and conspiracies were set on foot to overthrow the government and to return to the old absolute monarchy. A revolution by the natives for this purpose came to an unsuccessful conclusion in 1889. Two years later a new complication was added by the death of King Kalakaua, whose

<sup>35</sup> *Congressional Record*, Forty-eighth Congress, Second Session, pp. 506-13.

<sup>36</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1894, p. 917.

<sup>37</sup> *Senate Executive Document*, No. 77, Fifty-second Congress, Second Session, p. 166.

<sup>38</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1894, p. 917.

sister and successor, Queen Liliuokalani, was more devoted to the restoration of the native government and the old constitution than her brother had been. Under her administration the political elements opposed to the ruling foreign class became very active. Consequently the project of annexation to the United States was again revived, and American sugar-planters and other property-holders took up their old schemes for political union with renewed vigor.

At the same time, an additional impulse toward the movement for annexation was given by the course of tariff legislation in the United States. On the first day of October, 1890, the McKinley Bill received the approval of President Harrison. By its reciprocity provisions sugar from foreign countries under specified restrictions was admitted free of duty and a bounty granted to the producer of domestic sugar.<sup>39</sup> Although the Republican leaders disclaimed any intention of acting in bad faith with Hawaii,<sup>40</sup> the fact remained that the combined income of the Hawaiian producers was reduced annually more than \$5,000,000 — the amount of duty which had been remitted each year by the United States.

Under these circumstances, the annexation movement was brought to a climax. The Americans, who now had \$37,000,000 invested in sugar-production alone, and who owned 77 per cent. of the plantations and mills, took the leading part as in previous revolutions. They found an active supporter and confederate in the person of the American minister at Honolulu. At the same time the alliance of Queen Liliuokalani with the opium and lottery interests, in order to secure their assistance in establishing the monarchy, furnished a pretext for decisive action. A revolution was inaugurated, and on January 17 a proclamation was issued declaring the monarchy abrogated. A provisional government was established "to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon," and was immediately recognized by the American minister, who, after establishing a United States protectorate, at once notified the officials at Washington of his action, and pertinently added: "The Hawaiian pear is now fully ripe, and this is the golden hour for the United States to pluck it."<sup>41</sup>

On the same day that the provisional government was formed,

<sup>39</sup> *Reciprocity Treaties and Agreements*, "Summary of Commerce and Finance" (November, 1901), p. 1912.

<sup>40</sup> *Congressional Record*, Fifty-first Congress, Second Session, pp. 3616-20.

<sup>41</sup> *Messages and Papers*, Vol. IX, p. 464.

five commissioners were appointed to negotiate a treaty of annexation. The Commission reached Washington on February 3, 1893, and after several conferences with Secretary Foster a treaty was formally concluded providing for the full annexation of the islands and leaving the adjustment of all questions growing out of it to Congress. President Harrison, who strongly desired annexation, endeavored to have the treaty ratified during the last days of his administration, but Congress refused to accede to his wishes and left the treaty to be acted upon by the incoming party.<sup>42</sup>

On his accession to office in the following March, President Cleveland at once withdrew the proposed treaty from the Senate. At the same time, James H. Blount was sent as a special commissioner to the islands to make a personal investigation and to report as to the expediency of annexation. In his report Mr. Blount traced the origin of the protracted political strife and dissatisfaction on the islands to the control of the country's wealth and resources by foreigners and the consequent degradation of the natives. The recent revolution he denounced as a scheme of the sugar interests to secure some positive measure of relief from the losses arising from the operation of the McKinley Bill. Its success was attributed by him to the action of Minister Stevens in encouraging the annexation party and in giving the provisional government the armed support of this country. As his conclusion he stated that the majority of the inhabitants were opposed to the political union of the islands with the United States, and that he had found no annexationist who was willing to test the issue by a popular vote.<sup>43</sup>

The report of his commissioner was accepted by President Cleveland, who refused to return the treaty to the Senate for consideration;<sup>44</sup> and this attitude served as a temporary damper upon the movement for annexation. The provisional government, however, was made permanent, and unceasing efforts were put forward to turn the public mind of this country toward political union. The Wilson tariff law of 1894 reimposed the duty on sugar, and again brought wealth and prosperity to the sugar-planters, but they had gone too far to turn back. They still wished some definite and lasting basis of commercial union with this country which would not

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 348.

<sup>43</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1894, Appendix, "Affairs in Hawaii."

<sup>44</sup> *Messages and Papers*, Vol. IV, pp. 463, 464, 469, 470.

be subject to the variations of political belief and tariff legislation. The agitation for annexation was, therefore, continued from year to year,<sup>45</sup> until on July 16, 1897, another treaty providing for the annexation of the islands was drawn up by American and Hawaiian plenipotentiaries. This convention would probably have met the fate of its predecessors, but for the series of significant political events which closely followed its negotiation. The Spanish-American war marked, in the opinion of a large class of persons, the advent of the United States as a world-power. The imperialistic trend of opinion in the country was ready to give sanction to any acquisition of territory. With public feeling in this condition, it was not difficult to secure favorable action upon the Hawaiian annexation treaty. A joint-resolution accepting the proffered cession of the islands was adopted by Congress, and received the President's signature on July 7, 1898. On August 12 of the same year the sovereignty of the country was formally transferred to the United States, and the prediction that reciprocal trade would lead to political union was at last fulfilled. Many contributory circumstances assisted in bringing about the final result, but it was primarily due to the conditions growing out of the reciprocity treaty of 1876. That arrangement was practically a step toward the annexation of the Sandwich Islands.

#### MCKINLEY RECIPROCITY.

The reciprocity provisions of the McKinley tariff law were chiefly noteworthy as a clever political makeshift devised by Mr. Blaine to remove the critical conditions which were threatening the life of protection, but the state of public opinion which made possible their enactment was greatly influenced by political considerations of an international import. From the beginnings of South American independence, when Henry Clay had advocated the recognition of the newly created republics, and had attempted to organize the American continent against the Old World, a strong sentiment had

<sup>45</sup> The illogical attitude eventually assumed by some of the original advocates of reciprocity was as humorous as it was remarkable. Disregarding the fact that the reciprocity treaty had really been a concession to the sugar-planters to make their estates more profitable, the assertion was made that the United States was morally bound to annex the islands for the reason that under the protection extended by the reciprocity treaty American capital was led to invest in sugar plantations and allied industries.—LOREN A. THURSTON, "The Advantages of Annexation," *North American Review*, Vol. CLVI (1893), pp. 265-81.

existed in the United States favorable to closer relations with South America. It was thought that a commercial union would gain what the Monroe Doctrine had failed to accomplish—the separation of South America from European influence and the domination of this country in continental affairs. A practical demonstration of the efficacy of reciprocity in this respect was to be had at the time in Hawaii. Consequently many persons, aside from commercial and partisan reasons, advocated reciprocal trade because they thought it would secure an American foothold in South America.

This attitude was especially noticeable during the period 1880–90. The favorable consideration accorded the Mexican and Cuba treaties negotiated during the year 1882–84 was due to this state of public opinion, and the significance of this attitude was indicated by President Cleveland who, an outspoken opponent of reciprocity in general, recommended favorable action on the Hawaiian and Mexican conventions.<sup>46</sup>

Additional evidence of the strength of this form of opinion among many persons was furnished by the debate in Congress over the bill of 1888 providing for the summoning of a Pan-American congress at Washington. Many representatives gave free expression to the opinion that the time was opportune for bringing the South American republics into closer touch with the United States. It was contended that the United States had been too much absorbed in the past with the development of her material resources; that South America had been neglected, and we should now begin to cultivate our northern neighbors socially and politically. The projection of a transcontinental railroad and an isthmian ship canal, it was claimed, presented an opportune time for action, and the formation of a commercial union or the negotiation of a system of reciprocity treaties would go a long way toward uniting the three Americas in sentiment and purpose.<sup>47</sup> The conviction existed in the minds of many persons at the time that a system of reciprocity treaties or a commercial union with South America in which the United States would be the dominating figure would be valuable for the purpose of strengthening the doctrine laid down by Monroe, and as a means of widening our influence in the Western Hemisphere by drawing away the Latin-American republics from their European affiliations.

<sup>46</sup> *Messages and Papers*, Vol. VIII, pp. 337, 784, 785, 500, 501.

<sup>47</sup> *Congressional Record*, Fiftieth Congress, First Session, pp. 1656–58.

Through the tariff controversy of 1880-90 the protectionist leaders of course sought to utilize this idea of the extension of American political influence, and to enlist its adherents in support of the various expedients for averting tariff revision. In the recommendations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs regarding the appointment of a South American commission in 1884, the summoning of a Pan-American conference in 1888, and the incorporation of reciprocity in the McKinley law, seductive allusions were made to the "bonds of sympathy" existing between the South and Central American republics and our own government, and also to the earnest desire of the United States to strengthen its "friendly relations" with its southern neighbors.<sup>48</sup> Moreover, the bill authorizing the international American conference instructed the President to state that one of its objects was the consideration of an American customs union, and this proposal appealed to many persons as an expedient for cementing the political relations of the American republics in the same way that the German *Zollverein* of 1833 united the German states. All of these utterances, in fact, were couched in such terms that they could be favorably interpreted by the political expansionist as well as by the tariff reformer and the exporting interests. Consequently to those persons who stood for the extension of the political power of the United States southward McKinley reciprocity signified a tendency toward political or territorial expansion. They, therefore, gave it their support.

#### THE CUBAN TREATY.

A final illustration of the political significance of reciprocity has been furnished by the contest over the Cuban treaty. Its recent ratification by Congress brings our reciprocity history up to the present time.

On account of its proximity to the United States, Cuba has always offered an attractive field for American investors. This tendency was greatly increased during the period of American intervention and after the Cuban republic had been established. Prior to the Cuban insurrection it was estimated that about \$50,000,000 of American funds were invested in various enterprises in the island. During the American occupation about \$30,000,000 was

<sup>48</sup> *House Reports*, Nos. 124, 1240, 1445, Forty-eighth Congress, First Session; *House Miscellaneous Documents*, No. 193, Fifty-first Congress, First Session; *House Report*, No. 1827, do.

added to this sum. American capital became interested in an immense railway-development scheme which had for its object the opening up for settlement and production a hitherto uncultivated region of twelve to fifteen million acres. The copper-mining properties near Santiago were purchased by American capitalists. Iron interests to the amount of about \$5,000,000 were also acquired. The street-railway system of Havana passed into American hands, and the construction of lines in other cities was begun. The large cigar-manufacturing concerns were consolidated as a branch of the American Tobacco Company, with a capitalization of \$30,000,000. Some Americans also engaged in the cultivation of the Cuban tobacco leaf. Others entered commercial lines and opened hotels, banking houses, and similar enterprises of minor importance, representing the investment of several million dollars.

But the acquisition of sugar lands by non-residents of the islands during the American occupation proved to be the most significant fact in connection with reciprocity. Although the evidence as to this point is disputed, it is clear that large tracts of land were purchased by American interests.<sup>49</sup> In the fiscal provinces of Holquin and Cardenas it was estimated in December, 1902, by the agents of the War Department, in response to a House inquiry, that citizens of the United States had invested about \$475,000; in the province of Santiago de Cuba, Americans and other foreigners had acquired 16,250 acres of cane land; and in the suppressed zone of Cienfuegos citizens of the United States had purchased over 29,000 acres for cane-cultivation representing an investment of about \$1,500,000. At the same time it was reported that American non-residents actually owned 31,649 acres of cane land under cultivation in the different military districts.<sup>50</sup> During the next twelve months the same tendency toward investment in sugar lands as well as other enterprises continued. On September 1, 1903, it was stated that 7 or 8 per cent. of the sugar plantations, cattle ranges, small farms, and mines of the islands were held in fee simple by American interests. At the same time, Consul-General Steinhart reported that the actual capital invested by citizens of the United States in Cuba had

<sup>49</sup> *Reciprocity*, Appendix III, pp. 546-48.

<sup>50</sup> *House Miscellaneous Document*, No. 51, Fifty-seventh Congress, Second Session. These various estimates referred to actual change of ownership as shown by official records, and of course did not include the large amount of American capital otherwise invested in sugar-culture.

increased to \$100,000,000. This was presented in tabulated form as follows:<sup>51</sup>

Sugar plantations	-	-	-	\$25,000,000
Tobacco lands and factories	-			45,000,000
Fruit lands	-	-	-	3,500,000
Mining property	-	-	-	5,000,000
Cuba Railroad Company	-	-		12,000,000
Street railways	-	-	-	8,000,000
Other real estate and commercial investments	-	-	-	1,500,000
<hr/>				
Total	-	-	-	\$100,000,000

These figures are of great importance in their influence on the determination of the future relations between the United States and Cuba. The Spanish-American war had produced a strong imperialistic feeling in this country which would have readily sanctioned a territorial or political union of the two governments. But for the position of hypocrisy and the false appearance which this country would have had to assume before the nations of the world in the face of the Teller resolutions of 1898, Cuba probably would have been openly annexed. As it was, the disposition and intention among a large class of American citizens to exercise political and territorial control over the island existed, and the problem that presented itself was to accomplish this end without seeming to break our promises of 1898; or to depart from our lofty philanthropic and humanitarian attitude proclaimed to the world before the outbreak of hostilities with Spain. Those interests which had their capital invested in Cuba, as in the former case of the Hawaiian sugar-planters, did not wish the natives to secure control of the government of the island. In addition, many persons who were considering plans for investments in or trade with Cuba desired the United States to remain in power. These commercial and business interests of the United States believed that the opportunities for profit and exploitation would be lessened by the inauguration of a separate Cuban government, which they were convinced would go the way of all Latin-American Republics.

But the grosser desires of the commercial and industrial world which were really the determining forces of the situation were kept in the background, and an imperialistic propaganda was begun in a

<sup>51</sup> *Monthly Summary of Commerce and Finance*, August, 1903, p. 382.



more refined and vaporized form. Many advocates of Cuban annexation or control became suddenly and unaccountably alarmed over the danger to the Monroe Doctrine in the event that the United States should withdraw from Cuba. Proceeding upon the assumption that proper sanitary measures would not be maintained by the Cuban cities, they also saw in the turning over of the island to its inhabitants a menace to the health and safety of our southern ports. As a means of strengthening these claims, they finally asserted that the Treaty of Paris had imposed obligations upon the United States which could not be fulfilled without a considerable measure of control over Cuban affairs.

There was, however, still another class of expansionists who sincerely believed that the United States should annex Cuba. They frankly stated that the Teller resolutions were a serious mistake conceived in a moment of passionate humanity and sentimentalism, and that the promise of a separate government in Cuba uncontrolled by the American republic should never have been made. They declared that the island was of great strategic importance to the United States in that it commanded the entrances from the Atlantic to the Gulf of Mexico and the proposed isthmian canal. Every statesman since Jefferson, it was added, had recognized the value of Cuba and wanted to possess it, and weighty considerations of commercial and political expediency demanded that the contemporary American occupation of the country should be continued until Cuba was prepared to become a state of the Union.<sup>52</sup>

All the exponents of these diverse forms of imperialistic opinion were united in the single purpose to secure intimate relations with Cuba, or the extension of the political power of the United States over the island, and the agitation thus begun rapidly developed such strength that it became evident that it would have to be reckoned with by Congress and the administration. Long before the American occupation had come to an end it was known that some kind of control would be demanded from Cuba. What form it would take was soon indicated.<sup>53</sup>

Under date of July 25, 1900, Governor-General Wood issued a call for a constitutional convention to frame and adopt a government

<sup>52</sup> See SENATOR BEVERIDGE'S speech delivered in Chicago opening the campaign of 1900, *Review of Reviews*, Vol. XXII (1900), p. 394.

<sup>53</sup> WALTER WELLMAN, "The Cuban Republic—Limited," *Review of Reviews*, Vol. XXII (1900), pp. 708–12.

for Cuba and "to provide for and agree with the government of the United States upon the relations to exist between that government and the government of Cuba." These latter words aroused so much protest that General Wood subsequently modified them in Civil Order No. 455 (November 9, 1900) by the statement that it would be the duty of the convention "to formulate, what, *in your opinion*, ought to be the relations between the United States and Cuba." Thus mollified, the Cubans went to work, and by February 11, 1901, a constitution was completed: On this date a committee was appointed to prepare and report to the convention proposals regarding future relations with the United States, and there was every indication that the delegates intended to grant liberal commercial and political concessions. At this juncture, however, the favorable attitude of the convention was changed by the inopportune and unwarranted interference of the administration at Washington. On February 15 and 21 communications were received by Governor Wood which outlined the opinion of President McKinley as to what should be the proper relations between Cuba and the United States, and which really amounted to a request that this country might be permitted to violate the resolutions of 1898. These ideas were transmitted by General Wood as a "hint" for the guidance of the convention.

The delegates at once declared that the action of the American government was arbitrary and coercive, and such a storm of indignation and hostility was aroused that on February 26 the convention submitted its own proposals, which differed widely from those suggested by President McKinley as well as from the propositions which the convention had intended to adopt before the interference from Washington. On the following day, however, the delegates were forced into line, and the suggestions were adopted which the military government, acting for the president of the United States, had recommended.<sup>54</sup> On the same day the Platt amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill was adopted by the United States Senate. This series of resolutions, setting forth the proposals of the United States in the form of an ultimatum to Cuba, while nominally preserving the sovereignty and dignity of the island as an independent state, really had the effect of converting the country into a crippled dependency of the United States. The American govern-

<sup>54</sup> ALBERT G. ROBINSON, "The Work of the Cuban Constitutional Convention," *Forum*, Vol. XXXI (1901), pp. 401-12.

ment was to have virtual control of Cuban finances and foreign affairs, and was to have the right to intervene in case the preservation of Cuban independence was endangered. Naval stations were also to be leased or sold to the United States.<sup>55</sup>

This final action of the American government was unfavorably received in Cuba, and a prolonged debate followed its transmission to the constitutional convention. It was maintained that it would destroy all hope of Cuban independence, and its adoption was at first refused. After a heated discussion, however, and the receipt of assurances from Secretary Root, the convention finally decided to send a delegation to Washington to confer with the administration and to offer to accept the Platt amendment in case certain economic concessions were granted to Cuba. On April 25 the Cuban commission reached Washington and had an interview with President McKinley and other officials of the American government. They were told that unless the conditions of the Platt amendment were fully complied with the American troops would be kept in Cuba and the existing status would remain unchanged. They were also made aware of the strong sentiment in the United States favoring the annexation of Cuba, and were warned that a failure to accept the Platt amendment would probably result in Congress establishing a protectorate over Cuba. President McKinley advised the commissioners to recommend the adoption of the Platt amendment, and stated that while he, of course, could not guarantee anything, he would use all his influence to secure commercial concessions in the way of reciprocal trade for Cuba,<sup>56</sup> and that he would appoint a tariff commission to confer with the Cuban government after its establishment.

The Cubans returned satisfied that the president would use his power to secure tariff concessions, and much impressed by the fact that the Teller resolutions were the only obstacle which prevented the United States from annexing Cuba. After hearing the report, the Cuban convention adopted on the twelfth day of June an ordinance accepting the terms of the United States.

The death of President McKinley occurred before he could make known his promise of tariff concessions to Cuba, but President

<sup>55</sup> *Congressional Record*, Fifty-sixth Congress, Second Session, pp. 2954, 3145-52.

<sup>56</sup> "Hearings on Reciprocity with Cuba," *House Document* No. 535, Fifty-seventh Congress, First Session, pp. 411, 412; *Congressional Record*, Fifty-seventh Congress, First Session, pp. 4162, 4316.

Roosevelt on his accession to office informally announced that he would carry out the policy of his predecessor, and by his subsequent recommendations in favor of reciprocity, showed that he believed that the fulfilment of the pledge of tariff concessions to Cuba was a duty inherited from the McKinley administration. In his first annual message, at the opening of Congress in 1901-2 he used the following significant words:

Elsewhere I have discussed the question of reciprocity. In the case of Cuba, however, there are weighty reasons of morality and of national interest why the policy should be held to have a peculiar application. . . . Cuba has in her constitution affirmed what we desired, that she should stand, in international matters, in closer and more friendly relations with us than with any other power; and we are bound by every consideration of honor and expediency to pass commercial measures in the interest of her well-being.

In the subsequent controversy over reciprocity, the arguments as to our "plain duty" and "moral obligation" to Cuba were made much of, and were generally based, not on our action in 1898, but on the alleged promise of President McKinley to the Cuban convention that he would exert his power to secure tariff concessions in return for the adoption of the Platt amendment.

Reciprocity in the case of Cuba was, therefore, conceived as a tariff bribe to secure the suzerainty of the United States over the island. It was a case of *quid pro quo* in which reciprocal trade was used as a compensation for political favors. Cuba virtually agreed to become a dependency of the American government; and, in return, the United States promised to grant tariff concessions to Cuba. Reciprocity, in short, was used to secure the acceptance of the Platt amendment, which adroitly aimed to procure what could not be consistently or openly attained without the free consent of the inhabitants of Cuba—the political control of the island by the United States.

So much for the origin of Cuban reciprocity. It now remains to show the importance of the annexation idea in the contest over the adoption of the treaty.

With the advent of the reciprocity agitation the efforts of those who were striving for the incorporation of Cuba into the American republic were by no means diminished. Throughout the entire controversy that followed President Roosevelt's recommendation, the strength of the annexation movement, and its connection with the proposals for reciprocal trade, were clearly in evidence. They made

themselves manifest in several forms. In the first place, as had formerly happened in the discussion of the Canadian treaty, many persons in the United States opposed reciprocal trade under the belief that the failure to grant tariff concessions to Cuba would so augment the existing economic distress of its inhabitants that the only recourse left to them would be to seek a political union with the United States. By this plan a certain class of annexationists aimed to hasten our open political control over the country. A second class of persons, who saw the danger of this movement, and who were opposed to annexation, advanced the opinion that reciprocity was the only means of averting a closer political alliance, and therefore called upon all those interests which were working against reciprocity to unite in its favor for the purpose of preventing any further extension of the national domain.<sup>57</sup> Reciprocity, they argued, was the only alternative to annexation. Additional political significance was given to this phase of the controversy by the counter-statement of the beet-sugar people, who declared that, instead of fearing annexation, they preferred it to reciprocal trade, for the reason that the laws of the United States regarding contract labor would be enforced in the islands.<sup>58</sup>

By far the strongest movement, however, toward territorial extension was supported by those persons who advocated reciprocity as an expedient for securing annexation in the future. The so-called sugar trust, realizing that the treaty would be a source of profit to them, joined forces with the industrial and commercial interests which were pecuniarily interested in Cuba, to obtain the enactment of the reciprocity treaty. They were convinced that reciprocal trade would lead to the Americanization of the island, and would gradually pave the way toward the incorporation of Cuba into the Union. In this opinion they were joined by those expansionists who desired the acquisition of Cuba as a matter of international policy.

During the debate in Congress, free expression was given to the desire that Cuba should become a part of the American nation, and reciprocity was openly supported upon the ground that it would ultimately bring about annexation by promoting friendly and intimate relations with the new republic. Emphasis was laid upon the

<sup>57</sup> *House Report* No. 535, Fifty-seventh Congress, First Session, p. 47; *Congressional Record*, Fifty-seventh Congress, First Session, pp. 3855, 4400.

<sup>58</sup> *Congressional Record*, Fifty-seventh Congress, First Session, p. 3903.

political side of this argument by Representative Crumpacker, on November 17, 1903:

The location of Cuba, occupying as it does a commanding position over the Gulf of Mexico and the Isthmus of Panama, makes it imperatively necessary from a political standpoint that in a large sense American influence shall control the policy of the island. It is truly within the sphere of our political influence, and conditions upon the island — political, social, and commercial — are, and must forever be, so intimately connected with our own affairs that prudence demands that our relations with the new government shall be of the most intimate and cordial character possible. . . . Furthermore, it is the belief of many of our people that the ultimate destiny of Cuba will be annexation to the United States. That eventually can be justified only when the people of the island willingly consent to it . . . and no policy tends more to knit peoples together into closer friendship than intimate commercial intercourse. Therefore, for political reasons alone, there is abundant justification for the enactment of the pending measure.<sup>59</sup>

A few days later Senator Depew expressed regret that the Teller resolutions prevented us from openly acquiring Cuba, and indulged in the hope of ultimate political union with the country, toward which end reciprocal trade, he maintained, would be a desirable stepping-stone:

I certainly would not favor the annexation as yet of Cuba or any of these dependencies of ours . . . I would regard it as a misfortune to admit any of our dependencies as states until they are Americanized. . . . The day is not far distant when Cuba, resembling the United States in its constitution, laws, and liberties — and in all which goes to make up a country desirable to live in for people brought up and educated as are Americans — will have from five to six million people who are educated upon American lines, and worthy of all the rights of American citizenship. Then, with the initiative from Cuba, we can welcome another star to our flag.<sup>60</sup>

Representative Richardson, of Alabama, was also of the opinion that the reciprocity treaty would fulfil all the wishes of the annexationists by a slow but peaceful process. On November 18, 1903, he said:

Under all these circumstances it behooves us to cultivate and foster the most friendly and cordial relations with the Republic of Cuba. . . . We can best do that by establishing the freest relations of trade and commerce between the island and our country. To do this we more directly appeal to the heart

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, Fifty-eighth Congress, First Session, p. 263.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 161.

and love of Cuba than anything else. It is the road that leads, in my opinion, directly to what we all want to see—the annexation of Cuba to this country.<sup>61</sup>

At the same time, Representative Clark urged the House to support reciprocal trade for political reasons:

I am in favor of the bill because there are two pieces of ground on the North American continent that I want to see annexed to the United States. One is Cuba, and the other is every foot of the British North American possessions. . . . There is no reason why they should be conquered, and if they act with any sense, they will come to us peaceably, and this bill is a step in the right direction. If we want the friendship of Cuba . . . she will come to us in time without the expenditure of a dollar or the shedding of a single tear.<sup>62</sup>

There is no need of adding further illustrations of the strength of the movement for annexing Cuba, and of its reliance upon reciprocity as a device for eventually attaining its object. So far the main features of the controversy over Cuban reciprocity have practically been a repetition of the Hawaiian movement, and the general trend of the convention in the way of political expansion furnishes a close parallel to our previous experience in the Pacific. The origin of the treaty was different, but commercial interests of the same kind—American owners of Cuban sugar plantations, American investors in other Cuban enterprises, and the Atlantic coast sugar refiners—were primarily responsible for the reciprocal trade agitation. Likewise, as in the case of Hawaii, these commercial interests have been assisted by those persons who wished to acquire Cuba for the political predominance it would give as a base for naval operations, and who, for this reason, supported reciprocity because they regarded it as a step toward ultimate annexation. Prophecies are always hazardous, and it would be rash to predict that it will be in Cuba as it was in Hawaii. Moreover economic conditions in the two countries are not identical. It is a fact worthy of careful consideration, however, that almost the same forces which, under the delusive name of reciprocity, successfully brought about the acquisition of the Sandwich Islands, have been and still are at work in Cuba.

W. JETT LAUCK.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 203.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 162.